Green Burkas Start a Sand Storm: Iran’s Divisions and Relationship with the West

by Chase Mahlan

I’m fairly sure you have read about the events that have recently transpired in Iran. If not I’m positive enough to place a bet on the chance you’ve heard the words “Iran”, “election”, and “riot” uttered in the same sentence. Hopefully I won’t regret betting on this rather than red in roulette.

In order to understand the current situation and to give this election historical context, I’m going to briefly explain how Iran’s current theocratic democracy was created. In 1979, subsequent to the Islamic Revolution’s success in overthrowing the Western backed Shah, a theocratic Iranian republic was formed. Ayatollah Ali Khomenei became the Supreme Leader under the new Iranian constitution. He represented the new order of the velayat-e-faqih, or Islamic jurists, who would now hold the responsibility of “guardianship” over the Iranian people. The West viewed this coup d'état as a mere transition of absolute power. Although there is validity behind that belief, the newly formed theocracy was fervently supported at the dawn of its inception. Khomenei had much stronger backing and civilian consent in Iran than Lenin did in Russia sixty years earlier.

In contrast to previous elections, the difference with this Iranian election is that outcry hasn’t been restricted to thoughts or whispers. Mass protests in the Iranian capital of Tehran and in small pockets throughout the nation are profound reflections of a nation of people, which sees their vote as merely the diesel fuelling the false legitimacy of a corrupt government. This time they refused to let their energy power a repressive vehicle, knowing full well that the election was rigged. Instead they burned their energy fueling discontent and public unrest.

Many independent surveys showed either Mahmoud Ahmadinejad or Mir-Hossein Mousavi winning by a very slight margin. When the results of the election were unveiled on June 13th, the world learned that Ahmadinejad defeated Mousavi 62.63% to 33.75% (according to the Iranian government). So why would the outspoken supporter of Ahmadinejad and Supreme Leader of Iran Aytollah Ali Khomenei rig the final results? It’s simple really. The most obvious answer would be that Khomenei and Ahmadinejad did not want to risk a run-off, which was the expected result of the election. Turning the vote difference into a landslide was an adhesive attempting to cover the cracks in Iranian society. It is impossible to know if Ahmadinejad and Khomeini foresaw the mass protest, but one thing is for sure; the results were tampered with.

Ahmadinejad called Mousavi supporters a “minority of twigs and mote” and compared them to the disgruntled losing end of a football (soccer) match. On the day after the election, a few hundred Ahmadinejad and Mousavi supporters formed ranks outside Ministry of the Interior. They drew their oratory battle lines and began chanting, as the police filled the crevice between them. Then, out of nowhere, the police charged at the Mousavi supporters and began beating them with batons. Who are the football hooligans again?

The Western press might focus on an Iranian “dissent into chaos”, but in reality a huge percentage of Iran supports the outcome of the election, which is blatantly shown by the 20,000 Ahmadinejad supporters, who crammed into Tehran’s Vah Asr Square to celebrate the President’s victory. I don’t mean to say that most of Iran is content with the current government, but it is important to understand that division in Iranian society.

Like is often true with international relations, the United States and the West are not entirely innocent when it comes to Iran. Up until the Iranian Revolution, Britain and the U.S. were receiving huge oil contracts with Iran in exchange for supporting the Shah. From that point on, Iran has had a shaky relationship with the West and rightly so. The only positive outcome of this election is that Khomenei will be a lot more willing to strengthen American-Iranian relations with Ahmadinejad at the helm. President Obama was very careful when he addressed the Iranian people after the elections. He made sure not to provoke Ahmadinejad and Khomenei into a nationalistic defense, which they have used in the past. Britain, on the other hand, hasn’t been as lucky when it comes to Iranian relations. On June 23rd , Iran expelled two British diplomats on the grounds of being involved in “activities inconsistent with their diplomatic status.” Then on June 27th, Iranian officials arrested British embassy staff in Tehran, who were accused of having a “considerable role” in the electoral unrest. It is reasonable to assume that the Iranian government is using these accusations and expulsions in order to counteract the pro-Western sentiment and election protests. The current Iranian regime knows that Iran’s social spectrum is changing and blames the West for what is perceived as negative alternations.

Khomeini described Ahmadinejad’s reelection as a “divine assessment”. The assessment was about as divine as a bouncer rejecting someone who waited hours to enter a club. Mousavi responded by calling the outcome “a dangerous charade”. Thousands upon thousands of Iranians stood against authority in order to protest Mousavi’s well-deserved entry. The question is: where does Iran go from here? Ahmadinejad has made it clear that Iran will no longer tolerate protesters. Iranians have shown their resourcefulness in spreading their opinion and communicating organized protest. Even in the darkness of the post-election telecommunications and Internet blackout, Mousavi supporters battled censorship, organizing marches and rallies by word of mouth. For the first time since the Islamic revolution, people were willing to put their lives on the line to protest a cause they believed would positively alter their nation’s future.